\A letter was read from the superintendent of finance, enclosing letters from Dr. Franklin, accompanied with extracts from the Count de Vergennes relative to money affairs, the superintendent thereupon declaring roundly that our credit was at an end, and that no further pecuniary aids were to be expected from Europe. Mr. RUTLEDGE denied these assertions, and expressed some indignation at them. Mr. BLAND said, that as the superintendent was of this opinion, it would be absurd for him to be minister of finance, and moved that the committee on his motion for arranging the department might be instructed to report without loss of time. This motion was negatived as censuring the committee; but it was understood to be the sense of Congress that they should report.

The Order of the day, viz., the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs, was taken up.

Mr. WOLCOTT conceived it unnecessary to waste time on the subject, as he presumed Congress would never so far censure the ministers who had obtained such terms for this country as to disavow their conduct.

Mr. CLARK was decided against communicating the separate article, which would be sacrificing meritorious ministers, and would rather injure than relieve our national honor. He admitted that the separate article put an advantage into the hands of the enemy, but did not, on the whole, deem it of any great consequence. He thought Congress ought to go no further than to inform the ministers that they were sorry for the necessity which had led them into the part they had taken, and to leave them to get rid of the embarrassment as to the separate article, in such way as they should judge best. This expedient would save Congress, and spare our ministers, who might have been governed by reasons not known to Congress.

Mr. MERCER said, that, not meaning to give offence any where, he should speak his sentiments freely. He gave it as his clear and decided opinion, that the ministers had insulted Congress by sending them assertions, without proof, as reasons for Violating their instructions, and throwing themselves into the confidence of Great Britain. He observed, that France, in order to make herself equal to the enemy, had been obliged to call for aid, and had drawn Spain, against her interest, into the war; that it was probable that she had entered into some specific engagements for that purpose; that hence might be deduced the perplexity of her situation, of which advantage had been taken by Great Britain—an advantage in which our ministers had concurred—for sowing jealousies between France and the United States, and of which farther advantage would be taken to alienate the minds of the people of this country from their ally, by presenting him as the obstacle to peace. The British court, he said, having gained this point, may easily frustrate the negotiation, and renew the war against divided enemies. He approved of the conduct of the Count de Vergennes in promoting a treaty, under the first commission to Oswald, as preferring the substance to the shadow, and proceeding from a desire of peace. The conduct of our ministers throughout, particularly in giving in writing every thing called for by the British minister expressive of distrust of France, was a mixture of follies which had no example, was a tragedy to America, and a comedy to all the world beside. He felt inexpressible indignation at their meanly stooping, as it were, to lick the dust from the feet of a nation whose hands were still dyed with the blood of their fellow-citizens. He reprobated the chicane and low cunning which marked the journals transmitted to Congress, and contrasted them with the honesty and good faith which became all nations, and particularly an infant republic. They proved that America had at once all the follies of youth and all the vices of old age; thinks it would be necessary to recall our ministers; fears that France may be already acquainted with all the transactions of our ministers, even with the separate article, and may be only waiting the reception given to it by Congress, to see how far the hopes of cutting off the right arm of Great Britain, by supporting our revolution, may have been well founded; and, in case of our basely disappointing her, may league with our enemy for our destruction, and for a division of the spoils. He was aware of the risks to which such a league would expose France of finally losing her share, but supposed that the British Islands might be made hostages for her security. He said America was too prone to depreciate political merit, and to suspect where there was no danger; that the honor of the king of France was dear to him; that he never would betray or injure us, unless he should be provoked, and justified by treachery on our part. For the present he acquiesced in the proposition Of the secretary of foreign affairs; but, when the question should come to be put, he should be for a much more decisive resolution.

Mr. RUTLEDGE said, he hoped the character of our ministers would not be affected, much less their recall produced, by declamations against them; and that facts would be ascertained and stated, before any decision should be passed; that the Count de Vergennes had expressly declared to our ministers his desire that they might treat apart; alluded to, and animadverted upon, the instruction which submitted them to French councils; was of opinion that the separate article did not concern France, and therefore there was no necessity for communicating it to her; and that, as to Spain, she deserved nothing at our hands; she had treated us in a manner that forfeited all claim to our good offices or our confidence. She had not, as had been supposed, entered into the present war as an ally to our ally, for our support; but, as she herself had declared, as a principal, and on her own account. He said, he was for adhering religiously to the spirit and letter of the treaty with France; that our ministers had done so, and, if recalled or censured for the part they had acted, he was sure no man of spirit would take their place. He concluded with moving that the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs might be referred to a special committee, who might inquire into all the facts relative to the subject of it. Mr. HOLTEN seconded the motion.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was opposed to harsh treatment of the ministers, who had shown great ability. He said, they had not infringed the treaty, and, as they had received the concurrence of the Count de Vergennes for treating apart, they had not, in that respect, violated their instructions. He proposed that Congress should express to the ministers their concern at the separate article, and leave them to get over the embarrassment as they should find best.

Mr. MERCER, in answer to Mr. RUTLEDGE, said, that his language with respect to the ministers was justified by their refusal to obey instructions; censured with great warmth the servile confidence of Mr. Jay in particular, in the British ministers. He said, the separate article was a reproach to our character; and that, if Congress would not themselves disclose it, he would disclose it to his constituents, who would disdain to be united with those who patronize such dishonorable proceedings. He was called to order by the president, who said that the article in question was under an injunction of secrecy, and he could not permit the order of the House to be trampled upon.

Mr. LEE took notice that obligations in national affairs, as well as others, ought to be reciprocal, and he did not know that France had ever bound herself to like engagements, as to concert of negotiation, with those into which America had at different times been drawn. He thought it highly improper to censure ministers who had negotiated well; said that it was agreeable to practice, and necessary to the end proposed, for ministers, in particular emergencies, to swerve from strict instructions. France, he said, wanted to sacrifice our interests to her own, or those of Spain; that the French answer to the British memorial contained a passage which deserved attention on this subject. She answered the reproaches of perfidy contained in that memorial by observing that, obligations being reciprocal, a breach on one side absolved the other. The Count de Vergennes, he was sure, was too much a master of negotiation not to approve the management of our ministers. instead of condemning it. No man lamented more than he did any diminution of the confidence between this country and France; but if the misfortune should ensue, it could not be denied that it had originated with France, who has endeavored to sacrifice our territorial rights—those very rights which by the treaty she had guarantied to us. He wished the preliminary articles had not been signed without the knowledge of France, but was persuaded that, in whatever light she might view it, she was too sensible of the necessity of our independence to her safety ever to abandon it. But let no censure fall on our ministers, who had, upon the whole, done what was best. He Introduced the instruction of the fifteenth of June, 1781; proclaimed it to be the greatest opprobrium and stain to this country which it had ever exposed itself to; and that it was, in his judgment, the true cause of that distrust and coldness which prevailed between our ministers and the French court, inasmuch as it could not be viewed by the former without irritation and disgust. He was not surprised that those who considered France as the patron, rather than the ally, of this country, should be disposed to be obsequious to her; but he was not of that number.

Mr. HAMILTON urged the propriety of proceeding with coolness and circumspection. He thought it proper, in order to form a right judgment of the conduct of our ministers, that the views of the French and British courts should be examined. He admitted it as not improbable, that it had been the policy of France to procrastinate the definite acknowledgment of our independence on the part of Great Britain, in order to keep us more knit to herself, and until her own interests could be negotiated. The arguments, however, urged by our ministers on this subject, although strong, were not conclusive; as it was not certain that this policy, and not desire of excluding obstacles to peace, had produced the opposition of the French court to our demands. Caution and vigilance, he thought, were justified by the appearance, and that alone. But compare this policy with that of Great Britain; survey the past cruelty and present duplicity of her councils; behold her watching every occasion, and trying every project, for dissolving the honorable ties which bind the United States to their ally; and then say on which side our resentments and jealousies ought to lie. With respect to the instructions submitting our ministers to the advice of France, he had disapproved it uniformly since it had come to his knowledge, but he had always judged it improper to repeal it. He disapproved highly of the conduct of our ministers in not showing the preliminary articles to our ally before they signed them, and still more so of their agreeing to the separate article. This conduct gave an advantage to the enemy, which they would not fail to improve for the purpose of inspiring France with indignation and distrust of the United States. He did not apprehend (with Mr. Mercer) any danger of a coalition between France and Great Britain against America, but foresaw the destruction of mutual confidence between France and the United States, which would be likely to ensue, and the danger which would result from it, in case the war should be continued. He observed, that Spain was an unwise nation; her policy narrow and jealous; her king old; her court divided, and the heir-apparent notoriously attached to Great Britain. From these circumstances he inferred an apprehension, that when Spain should come to know the part taken by America with respect to her, a separate treaty of peace might be resorted to. He thought a middle course best with respect to Our ministers; that they ought to be commended in general; but that the communication of the separate article ought to take place. He observed, that our ministers were divided as to the policy of the court of France, but that they all were agreed in the necessity of being on the watch against Great Britain. He apprehended that if the ministers were to be recalled or reprehended, they would be disgusted, and head and foment parties in this country. He observed, particularly with respect to Mr. Jay, that, although he was a man of profound sagacity and pure integrity, yet he was of a suspicious temper, and that this trait might explain the extraordinary jealousies which he professed. He finally proposed that the ministers should be commended, and the separate article communicated. This motion was seconded by Mr. OSGOOD, as compared, however, with the proposition of the secretary for foreign affairs, and so far only as to be referred to a committee.

Mr. PETERS favored a moderate course, as most advisable. He thought it necessary that the separate article should be communicated, but that it would be less painful to the feelings of the ministers if the doing it were left to themselves; and Was also in favor of giving the territory, annexed by the separate article to West Florida, to such power as might be vested with that colony in the treaty of peace.

Mr. BLAND said he was glad that every one seemed, at length, to be struck with the impropriety of the instruction submitting oar ministers to the advice of the French court. He represented it as the cause of all our difficulties, and moved that it might be referred to the committee, with the several propositions which had Been made. Mr. LEE seconded the motion.

Mr. WILSON objected to Mr. BLAND’S motion, as not being in order. When moved in order, perhaps he might not oppose the substance of it. He said, he had never seen nor heard of the instruction it referred to until this morning, and that it had really astonished him; that this country ought to maintain an upright posture between all nations. But however objectionable this step might have been in Congress, the magnanimity of our ally in declining to obtrude his advice on our ministers ought to have been a fresh motive to their confidence and respect. Although they deserved commendation in general for their services, in this respect they do not. He was of opinion, that the spirit of the treaty with France forbade the signing of the preliminary articles without her consent, and that the separate article ought to be disclosed; but as the merits of our ministers entitled them to the mildest and most delicate mode in which it could be done, he wished the communication to be left to themselves, as they would be the best judges of the explanation which ought to be made for the concealment; and their feelings would he less wounded than if it were made without their intervention. He observed, that the separate article was not important in itself and became so only by the mysterious silence in which it was wrapped up. A candid and open declaration from our ministers of the circumstances under which they acted, and the necessity produced by them of pursuing the course marked out by the interest of their country, would have been satisfactory to our ally—would have saved their own honor—and would not have endangered the objects for which they were negotiating.

Mr. HIGGINSON contended, that the facts stated by our ministers justified the part they had taken.

Mr. MADISON expressed his surprise at the attempts made to fix the blame of all our embarrassments on the instruction of June the fifteenth, 1781, when it appeared that no use had been made of the power given by it to the court of France; that our Ministers had construed it in such a way as to leave them at full liberty; and that no one in Congress pretended to blame them on that account. For himself, he was persuaded that their construction was just; the advice of France having been made a guide to them only in cases where the question respected the concessions of the United States to Great Britain necessary and proper for obtaining peace and an acknowledgment of independence; not where it respected concessions to other powers, and for other purposes. He reminded Congress of the change which had taken place in our affairs since that instruction was passed; and remarked the probability that many who were now, perhaps, the loudest in disclaiming, would, under the circumstances of that period, have been the foremost to adopt it.* He admitted, that the change of circumstances had rendered it inapplicable, but thought an express repeal of it might, at this crisis at least, have a bad effect. The instructions, he observed, for disregarding which our ministers had been blamed, and which, if obeyed, would have prevented the dilemma now felt, were those which required them to act in concert and in confidence with our ally; and these instructions, he said, had been repeatedly confirmed, in every stage of the revolution, by unanimous votes of Congress; several of the gentlemen present,† who now justified our ministers, having concurred in them, and one of them‡ having penned two of the acts, in one of which Congress went farther than they had done in any preceding act, by declaring that they would not make peace until the interests of our allies and friends, as well as of the United States, should be provided for.

[Note: The committee who reported the instruction were Mr. Carroll, Mr. Jones, Mr. Witherspoon, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Matthews. Mr. Witherspoon was particularly prominent throughout.]

[Note: Messrs. Bland, Lee, and Rutledge.]

[Note: Mr. Rutledge who framed in the committee the first draft of the declaration made in September last, and the instruction about the same time. This was considerably altered, but not in that respect.]

As to the propriety of communicating to our ally the separate article, he thought it resulted clearly from considerations both of national honor and national security. He said, that Congress, having repeatedly assured their ally that they would take no step in a negotiation but in concert and in confidence with him, and having even published to the world solemn declarations to the same effect, would, if they abetted this concealment of their ministers, be considered by all nations as devoid of all constancy and good faith; unless a breach of these assurances and declarations could be justified by an absolute necessity, or some perfidy on the part of France; that it was manifest no such necessity could be pleaded; and as to perfidy on the part of France, nothing but suspicions and equivocal circumstances had been quoted in evidence of it,—and even in these it appeared that our ministers were divided; that the embarrassment in which France was placed by the interfering claims of Spain with the United States must have been foreseen by our ministers, and that the impartial public would expect that, instead of coöperating with Great Britain in taking advantage of this embarrassment, they ought to have made every allowance and given every facility to it, consistent with a regard to the rights of their constituents; that, admitting every fact alleged by our ministers to be true, it could by no means be inferred that the opposition made by France to our claims was the effect of any hostile or ambitious designs against them, or of any other design than that of reconciling them with those of Spain; that the hostile aspect which the separate article, as well as the concealment of it, bore to Spain, would be regarded by the impartial world as a dishonorable alliance with our enemies against the interests of our friends; but notwithstanding the disappointments and even indignities which the United States had received from Spain, it could neither be denied nor concealed that the former had derived many substantial advantages from her taking part in the war, and had even obtained some pecuniary aids; that the United States had made professions corresponding with those obligations; that they had testified the important light in which they considered the support resulting to their cause from the arms of Spain by the importunity with which they had courted her alliance, by the concessions with which they had offered to purchase it, and by the anxiety which they expressed at every appearance of her separate negotiations for a peace with the common enemy.

That our national safety would be endangered by Congress making themselves a party to the concealment of the separate article, he thought could be questioned by no one. No definitive treaty of peace, he observed, had as yet taken place; the important articles between some of the belligerent parties had not even been adjusted; our insidious enemy was evidently laboring to sow dissensions among them; the incaution of our ministers had but too much facilitated them between the United States and France; a renewal of the war, therefore, in some form or other, was still to be apprehended; and what would be our situation if France and Spain had no confidence in us,—and what confidence could they have, if we did not disclaim the policy which had been followed by our ministers?

He took notice of the intimation given by the British minister to Mr. Adams, of an intended expedition from New York against West Florida, as a proof of the illicit confidence into which our ministers had been drawn, and urged the indispensable duty of Congress to communicate it to those concerned in it. He hoped if a committee should be appointed—for which, however, he saw no necessity—that this would be included in their report, and that their report would be made with as little delay as possible.

In the event, the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs, with all the despatches, and the several propositions which had been made, were committed to Mr. Wilson, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Hamilton.

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