 1787
| October 1787
|  Oct 1, 1787: Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Virginia)
| The Virginian Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee informs George Mason, the author of the Virginia Bill of Rights, that absence of a Bill of Rights in the proposed Constitution is troublesome and imprudent: "the most express declarations and reservations are necessary to protect the just rights and liberty of Mankind from the silent powerful and ever active conspiracy of those who govern."
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| Oct 5, 1787: Centinel I (Pennsylvania)
| The Antifederalist Centinel opens his remarks, addressed to the Freemen of Pennsylvania, with a reminder and a question: the essential liberties of the people are secured in the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights; are they secure under the proposed Constitution? He suggests that "all the blessings of liberty and the dearest privileges of freemen are now at stake and dependent on your present conduct."
Beware, he adds, the work of "artful and designing men." After all, the Convention is inspired by John Adams's political thought on "good government" which presumes a balancing of three orders of society in three branches. Accordingly, following Adams, we do not need to attend to the virtue of the people. Furthermore, the plan encourages the exercise of extensive powers by the general government—see the general welfare clause and the supremacy clause—over an extensive territory, which is a recipe not "for a regular balanced government" but for "a permanent ARISTOCRACY."
Centinel concludes that 1) the new Constitution does not include a bill of rights to ward of future crises and 2) we are not currently in such crisis that we must adopt the Constitution right away. That we are in crisis "is the argument of tyrants."
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| Oct 8, 1787: Federal Farmer I (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer's "first principle question" is ought we "to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution?" No. "Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men, I conceive, will plunge us into commotions." True, we had difficulties under the Articles, but they weren't that bad to warrant the hasty adoption of a "consolidated" plan of the Constitution. "The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider a very unfortunate event to the United States. Had they attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in the very part of the plan." He concludes: the proposed Constitution "appears to be a plan retaining some federal features, but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly, to one consolidated government of the United States." The Constitution, according to the Federal Farmer, is currently partly national and partly federal, but it contains the strong potentiality to become wholly national.
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| Oct 9, 1787: Federal Farmer II (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer focuses on three main objections in this essay. He claims that the proposed Constitution 1) fails the "full and equal representation" test 2) inadequately separates the powers of government and 3) has a strong tendency to consolidation.
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| Oct 10, 1787: Federal Farmer III (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer continues his critique of the proposed Constitution: "I will examine first, the organization of the proposed government in order to judge, second, with propriety, what powers are improperly, at least prematurely lodged in it. I shall examine, third, the undefined powers, and fourth, those powers, the exercise of which is not secured on safe and proper ground."
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| Oct 12, 1787: Federal Farmer IV (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer, without mentioning James Wilson by name, criticizes the claim of the State House Speech that a bill of rights is unnecessary and dangerous. The Federal Farmer argues that the provisions of Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution are a partial bill of rights—see the restriction on ex post facto laws—so why don't we either drop them or go the whole distance and itemize a bill of rights that incudes "other essential rights"?
The Federal Farmer is concerned that the Constitution contains within itself the potentiality to become a consolidated government despite Wilson's argument that the Constitution only bestows powers that are clearly stated. Wilson seems to be arguing that the Framers created a confederacy with expressly delegated powers! How strange is that! The Federal Farmer thinks the Framers created a government and not simply a revision of a confederation. Thus the need for a comprehensive bill of rights since the Constitution contains the seeds of permitting a general government to operate with unlimited powers.
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| Oct 16, 1787: Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (New York)
| Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee, introducer of the Declaration of Independence, presumed author of the influential Federal Farmer essays and president of the Confederation Congress, suggested fourteen necessary and proper amendments to the proposed constitution, all designed "to protect the just rights and liberty of mankind from the silent powerful and ever active conspiracy of those who govern."
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| Oct 18, 1787: Brutus I (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist, anticipating by two weeks the opening paragraph of Federalist 1, also addressed to the people of New York, introduces his own first essay with the observation that "the most important question that was ever proposed to your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you." Nothing less than "the dignity of human nature" and the blessings of liberty are at stake. Brutus then argues that "although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it." The necessary and proper clause, the supremacy clause, and the judicial power have the potentiality to transform America from a system of confederated states into a "complete consolidated government." And anticipating the distinction between a democracy and a republic in Federalist 10 and 63, and agreeing that a representative government is to be preferred to a pure democracy, Brutus then argues that, contrary to wisdom and experience, the Framers have given us "an extensive republic" rather than a confederation of small republics. A "free republic" over "such vast extent" of territory is impracticable because, in time, the people will become "acquainted with very few of their rulers" and lose "confidence" in, and control over, the government.
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| Oct 18, 1787: Elbridge Gerry's Objections (Massachusetts)
| The Antifederalist Elbridge Gerry submits to the Massachusetts Legislature his principal reasons for not signing the Constitution on 17 September 1787 "that there is no adequate provision for a representation of the people; that they have no security for the right of election; that some of the powers of the Legislature are ambiguous, and others indefinite and dangerous, that the Executive is blended with and will have an undue influence over the Legislature; that the judicial department will be oppressive; that treaties of the highest importance may be formed by the President with the advice of two thirds of a quorum of the Senate; and that the system is without the security of a bill of rights." He urges that the plan be amended before being adopted.
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| Oct 25, 1787: Cato III (New York)
| New York Antifederalist Cato takes up "this new form of national government," and compares it with "the experience and opinions of the most sensible and approved political authors, and to show you that its principles, and the exercise of them, will be dangerous to your liberty and happiness." In particular, he shows that the proposed Constitution deviates from the teaching of the great oracle Montesquieu on federalism.
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| Oct 27, 1787: An Old Whig IV (Pennsylvania)
| An Old Whig, a prominent Pennsylvania Antifederalist, contends that the Constitution contains the potentiality to produce a consolidated government ruling over one large territory. But "all political writers agree, that a Republican government can exist only in a narrow territory." In contrast to the proposed Constitution, he advocates that "a Confederacy of Republics must be the establishment in America." Given the tendency in the Constitution to destroy liberty, he turns to the case for a bill of rights. "Before we establish government, whose acts will be THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND, and whose power will extend to almost every case without exception, we ought carefully to guard ourselves by a BILL OF RIGHTS, against the invasion of those liberties which it is essential for us to retain, which it is of no use to government to strip us of; but which in the course of human events have been too often insulted with all the wantonness of an idle barbarity."
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| November 1787
| Nov 1, 1787: An Old Whig V (Pennsylvania)
| An Old Whig offers two arguments against the adoption of the Constitution in its present state. First, he argues that the people should never "surrender up" to government the "LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE." If we look at the Constitution, he continues, "not a word has been mentioned in any part of it; but we are left in this important article, as well as many others, entirely to the mercy of future rulers." And how will these wicked future rulers invade our essential rights of "liberty of conscience, of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their thoughts on public matters, of trial by jury, of holding themselves, their houses and papers free from seizure and search upon general suspicion and general warrants?" How will the people be "secured in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property without depending on the will and pleasure of their rulers?" The future rulers will rely on the "unlimited power of taxation," and the presence of "a standing army." Second, he warns that the Presidency "is in reality to be a KING." Are we ready "to receive a king?"
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| Nov 1, 1787: Brutus II (New York)
| He considers "the merits" of his argument in Brutus I "that to reduce the thirteen states into one government, would prove the destruction of your liberties." Again anticipating The Federalist, Brutus argues that "when a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be firmly laid." But the foundation of the Constitution is poorly laid because it lacks a declaration of rights "expressly reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights, as are not necessary to be parted with." He rejects as "specious" the arguments of an unnamed Framer's State House speech (James Wilson) as to why a bill of rights is unnecessary: after all, "the powers, rights, and authority, granted to the general government by this constitution, are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any state government." Furthermore, why did the Framers secure certain rights in Article I, Section 9, "but omitted others of more importance"?
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| Nov 8, 1787: Centinel III (Pennsylvania)
| The Antifederalist Centinel, echoing the remarks of Federalist 1, reminds his readers that they are called upon to make a decision "which involves in it not only your fate, but that of your posterity for ages to come." Your determination will either ensure the possession of those blessings which render life desirable, or entail those evils which make existence a curse. That such are the consequences of a wise or improper organization of government, the history of mankind abundantly testifies." Unfortunately, however, the proponents "have hurried on its adoption with a precipitation that betrays their design." They are up to no good.
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| Nov 15, 1787: Brutus III (New York)
| In this essay, Brutus, anticipating Federalist 55, attempts to show that in the Constitution "the powers are not properly deposited, for the security of public liberty." He is a firm supporter of the position that "representation in government should be in exact proportion to the numbers" of people. Thus he is upset with 1) the 3/5 provision in the scheme of representation in the House, 2) equal representation for the States in the Senate, 3) the insufficiency in the number of representatives to be elected, 4) the lack of provision for a "resemblance" of the "true likeness of the people" in the assembly, 5) the probability that only the "rich" and "well born" will be represented, and 6) things will get worse. In short, "the representation is merely nominal—a mere burlesque; and that no security is provided against corruption and undue influence."
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| Nov 15, 1787: Essay by a Georgian (Georgia)
| The Antifederalist A Georgian invites his readers to decide whether or not the new plan of government conforms to "that very government intended by our glorious Declaration of Independence." He is concerned that the proposed government will lead to the erection of "an ARISTOCRATIC government, whereby about 70 nabobs would lord over three millions of people as slaves." He begs his readers to "call to mind our glorious Declaration of Independence; read it, and compare it with the federal constitution; what a degree of apostacy will you not then discover." Guard "against the numberless evils of an unlimited taxation, against the fatal effects of a standing army in times of peace, against an unfair and too small representation."
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| Nov 22, 1787: Cato V (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist Cato, summarizes the main points of his previous contribution in Cato IV: the "vague and inexplicit" nature of Article II, the Presidential article, could "lead to oppression and ruin." So why are you prepared to "adopt a system so vague, and which has discarded so many of your valuable rights? Is it because you do not believe that an American can be a tyrant?" He turns now to his critique of Article I: biennial elections are "a departure from the safe democratical principles of annual ones, that the number of representatives are too few" etc. "But this subject has been so ably and fully treated by a writer under the signature of Brutus, that I shall content myself with referring you to him thereon."
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| Nov 28, 1787: An Old Whig VII (Pennsylvania)
| The Old Whig reiterates a central Antifederalist objection to the proposed Constitution: the delegates to the Constitutional Convention did not have the authority to scrap the Articles of Confederation, nor do they have the authority to deny the people of the states the right to alter or abolish the plan submitted to them. Accordingly, Old Whig suggests that another Continental Convention, collecting the opinions of the people is in order.
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| Nov 29, 1787: Brutus IV (New York)
| Anticipating Federalist 51 and 55, Brutus states that "experience has taught mankind" the need for special precautions in the framing of free governments. "The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation; this, therefore, is the great desideratum in politics." It is more important that the government be in accordance "with the will of the people" and not "the will of the few" rather than "the administration of it be good or ill." Brutus ends with a prophecy: "power, lodged in the hands of rulers to be used at discretion, is almost always used to the oppression of the people, and the aggrandizement of themselves."
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| Nov 30, 1787: Centinel IV (Pennsylvania)
| Concerning the proposed Constitution, the Antifederalist Centinel is distrustful of "the conduct of its authors and patrons." After all, "the evil genius of darkness presided at its birth, it came forth under the veil of mystery, its true features being carefully concealed, and every deceptive art has been and is practicing to have this spurious brat received as the genuine offspring of heaven born liberty & .It is to be lamented that the interested and designing have availed themselves so successfully of the present crisis" to create a government destructive to the principles of liberty.
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| December 1787
| Dec 1787: John DeWitt IV (Massachusetts)
| The Massachusetts Antifederalist John De Witt informs his readers that the proponents of the Constitution have not engaged in "cool reasoning and dispassionate argument." Instead, they bestow on the critics "the opprobrious terms of insurgents, destroyers of all government, bankrupts, defaulters, and anti federalists, which is worse than jacobitism."
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| Dec 1787: John DeWitt IV (Massachusetts)
| The Massachusetts Antifederalist John De Witt informs his readers that the proponents of the Constitution have not engaged in "cool reasoning and dispassionate argument." Instead, they bestow on the critics "the opprobrious terms of insurgents, destroyers of all government, bankrupts, defaulters, and anti federalists, which is worse than jacobitism."
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| Dec 3, 1787: Agrippa IV (Massachusetts)
| The Antifederalist Agrippa reminds his readers "it is the opinion of the ablest writers on the subject, that no extensive empire can be governed upon republican principles, and that such a government will degenerate to a despotism unless it be made up of a confederacy of smaller states, each having the full powers of internal regulation. This is precisely the principle which has hitherto preserved our freedom." Moreover, "the idea of an uncompounded republic, on an average, one thousand miles in length, and eight hundred in breadth, and containing six million white inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals or habits, and of laws, is in itself an absurdity and contrary to the whole experience of mankind." But that is the idea behind the proposed plan.
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| Dec 13, 1787: Brutus V (New York)
| Brutus turns to an examination of "the nature and extent of the powers granted
to the legislature." He considers this inquiry to be a necessary preliminary to the larger question of just how separate are the powers lodged in the separate branches of the federal government. He interprets these legislative powers, or means, in light of the Preamble that sets down the ends of the new government and the supremacy clause of Article VI; he declares that Congress is granted all power over taxation, and to pass all necessary and proper laws, all the better for carrying out the comprehensive and undefined ends of the Preamble. This Constitution does not guarantee to the states "the power to conduct certain internal concerns." All the more reason, says Brutus, for a bill of rights restricting the reach of Congress over the authority of the states and the liberty of the people, and a larger number of representatives in the Congress.
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| Dec 16, 1787: Cato VI (New York)
| New York Antifederalist Cato warns his readers that 1) the new government will be an expensive burden on ordinary people 2) "none but men of opulence will hold a seat" in the Senate 3) the House is too "feeble" to "hold the balance against them" and 4) " the executive and senate can destroy the independence of the majority in the house of representatives and 5) "you are told to adopt this government first, and you will always be able to alter it afterwards. This would be first submitting to be slaves and then taking care of your liberty; when your chains are on, then act like freemen."
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| Dec 18, 1787: Agrippa VII (Massachusetts)
| The Massachusetts Antifederalist Agrippa says, "it is in vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is only by protecting local concerns, that the interest of the whole is preserved." And these local interests ought to be represented in the general government. But they are not adequately represented under the proposed Constitution. "The perfection of government depends on the equality of its operation, as far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the empire, and upon all citizens…the government ought to have the same authority in one place as another." But the Constitution does not meet this test. "I have now gone through two parts of my argument, and have proved the efficiency of the state governments for internal regulation, and the disadvantages of the new system, at lest some of the principal."
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| Dec 18, 1787: The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania)
| A minority of the delegates attending the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention offered 14 objections to the Constitution. They argued, in dissent, that the following rights were insecure under the Constitution: the right of conscience, trial by jury, no excessive fines and bail requirements, no unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of speech and press, bearing arms, and the right "to fowl and hunt." They also urged that adequate provision be made for the increase in the number of representatives along with their annual election, the protection of each state's jurisdiction over the militia as well as no standing armies in time of peace, a strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine and finally an assurance that the powers of the judiciary will be limited.
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| Dec 21, 1787: Robert Yates and John Lansing, Reasons of Dissent (New York)
| New York Antifederalists John Lansing and Robert Yates informed Governor Clinton that there were two principles that motivated their early departure from the Constitutional Convention. "First. The limited and well-defined powers under which we acted, and which could not, on any possible construction, embrace an idea of such magnitude, as to assent to a general constitution, in subversion of that of the state. "Second. A conviction of the impracticability of establishing a general government, pervading every part of the United States, and extending essential benefits to all."
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| Dec 27, 1787: Centinel VII (Pennsylvania)
| The Antifederalist Centinel, writing shortly after the passage of the Constitution by the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, refuses to validity of the outcome. "Will the act of one sixth of the people, and this too founded on deception and surprise, bind the community? Is it thus that the altar of liberty, so recently crimsoned with the blood of our worthies, is to be prostrated and despotism reared on its ruins? Certainly not." He urges the people to require their representatives to call a convention for the purpose of overturning the proposed plan created by "a junto composed of the lordly and high minded gentry, of the profligate and the needy office hunters, of men principally who in the late war skulked from the common danger."
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| Dec 27, 1787: Brutus VI (New York)
| Will the Constitution, in its frame and operation, "annihilate the state governments?" Will the state governments lose control of their internal police? Brutus answers, "yes" to both questions. It will be said that the states have the concurrent power of taxation. Brutus responds that here is no limit to the power of Congress under Article I, Section 8 "unless the people rise up, and, with a strong hand, resist and prevent the execution of constitutional laws." He is concerned that the general government will extend its reach into virtually every aspect of life. After all what issue can't be placed under the common defense and general welfare clauses? He concludes this essay with a refutation of Hamilton's argument in Federalist 23 that "the means, says the gentleman, ought to be proportioned to the end." But don't we have two levels of government? Shouldn't the state government have "an uncontroulable power to raise a revenue, adequate to the exigencies of their governments?"
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| Dec 29, 1787: Centinel VIII (Pennsylvania)
| The Antifederalist Centinel; asks where is the crisis that demands the hasty adoption of an untried plan of government? There is none: "a happy equality and independency pervades the community; it is here the human mind, untrammeled by the restraints of arbitrary power, expands every faculty & The unfortunate and oppressed of all nations fly to this grand asylum where liberty is ever protected, and industry crowned with success." He thus questions the motives of the Framers and accusing them of being "conspirators against our liberties." In fact, "so flagrant, so audacious a conspiracy against the liberties of a free people is without precedent."
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| Dec 31, 1787: Federal Farmer VII (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer argues that underlying all forms of government there are but two principles or "important springs which alone move the machines and give them their intended influence and control." Theirs are "force and persuasion." In this essay, "I repeat my observation that the plan proposed will have a doubtful operation between the two principles; and whether it will preponderate towards persuasion or force is uncertain."
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1788
| January 1788
| Jan 1788: Address by a Plebian (New York)
| The Massachusetts Federalists proposed and a sufficient number of Antifederalists agreed to what is known as the Massachusetts Compromise: ratify now amend later. The New York Antifederalist, A Plebian, urges New Yorkers to reject this strategy. "When we consider the nature and operation of government, the idea of receiving a form radically defective under the notion of making the necessary amendments is evidently absurd." We are asked to adopt the Constitution first, and then amend it. "I ask, why not amend, and then adopt it?"
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| Jan 3, 1788: Cato VII (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist Cato warns his readers that the proposed Constitution does not provide an adequate check and balance system between the Senate and the President. Accordingly, and contrary to the advice of Montesquieu, the American people are being asked to place an unreasonable trust in the virtue of their rulers.
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| Jan 3, 1788: Brutus VII (New York)
| Brutus repeats his claim that a guaranteed source of revenue must be provided to each level of government in a "complex" "confederated government." However. "no such allotment has been made in this government." He again refers several times to the fallacious arguments of Federalist 23 without identifying the "writer." That argument presumes, says Brutus, that 1) securing the general welfare and common defense are the exclusive province of the general government. On the contrary, the general government is to protect "against foreign attacks," leaving to the state government the internal task "of administering justice among its citizens." It also presumes that 2) the glory of the nation is the measure of the happiness of the people. According to Brutus, "the ability and character of the convention, who framed the preferred constitution, is sounded forth and reiterated by every declaimer and writer in its favor, is a powerful argument to induce its adoption. "But are not the patriots who guided our councils in the perilous times of the war, entitled to equal respect?" "A defensive war is the only one I think justifiable." Finally, it argues that we cannot anticipate the future. True, but in extraordinary times, the best defense is the "happiness and good order of the people."
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| Jan 4, 1788: Federal Farmer IX (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer states that the objective in framing free government ought to the creation of a scheme of representation so that we have "equal liberty, and equal laws diffusing their influence among all orders of men; to obtain this we must guard against the bias of interest and passions, against interested combinations, secret or open. We must aim at a balance of efforts and strength." He argues that the proposed Constitution fails this objective.
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| Jan 10, 1788: Brutus VIII (New York)
| Brutus continues his examination of Article I, Section 8. He states that the Constitution provides that the power to 1) "borrow money is general and unlimited." Accordingly, the general government "may create a national debt, so large, as to exceed the ability of the country ever to sink." He understands that emergencies might arise and accordingly, suggests a two-thirds vote to authorize such borrowing. 2) the power to "raise armies, is indefinite and unlimited and authorizes the raising of forces, as well in peace as in war." Standing armies in peacetime are dangerous to liberty. He ends with this axiom: "the general government ought not to have authority to do it; for no government should be empowered to do that which if done, would tend to destroy public liberty."
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| Jan 12, 1788: Federal Farmer XII (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer criticizes the inadequate protection given to "the impartiality and security of elections" in the proposed Constitution. He also recommends, "increasing the federal representation and adopting the principles of district elections."
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| Jan 17, 1788: Brutus IX (New York)
| Brutus begins the essay with the following statement: "The design of civil government is to protect the rights and promote the happiness of the people." And the question of this essay is: Does the Constitution pass this test? The state constitutions pass the test because their constitutions have either a prefatory bill of rights or restrictions on power within their documents. But the Framers of the general government leave us confused. They constrain the general government from doing some things—no bill of attainder—but don't address others—no standing army in time of peace—so what are they up to? Brutus criticizes the arguments of an unidentified "author" who argues that a provision in the Constitution with respect to standing armies is unnecessary and dangerous. Over half the essay is then devoted to criticizing the remarks of "a writer who is the boast of the advocates of this new constitution" on behalf of standing armies. This writer, says Brutus, calls "into question the candor and integrity of those who advance the objection," and with insinuating that "their intention is to mislead the people, by alarming their passions, rather than convincing them by arguments addressed to their understandings." We think Brutus has in mind Hamilton's remarks in Federalist 1.
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| Jan 23, 1788: Federal Farmer XVII (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer argues that "a free and mild government can be preserved in their extensive territories, only under the substantial forms of a federal republic." This essay answers the question: "how far" does the proposed plan "partake of a federal republic?" The answer is not far enough.
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| Jan 24, 1788: Brutus X (New York)
| "The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing army, not only because the rulers may employ them for the purposes of supporting themselves in any usurpations of power, which they may see proper to exercise, but there is a great hazard, that an army will subvert the forms of the government, under whose authority, they are raised, and establish one, according to the pleasures of their leader." Thank goodness that Washington, unlike "a Julius Cesar or a Cromwell" was "a patriot as well as a general." True, we need to maintain garrisons and be prepared for necessities, but why does this admission lead automatically to standing armies in time of peace? He is referring, w/o citing the "writer," to the "curious" arguments of Hamilton in Federalist 24-26. Brutus concludes that the state legislatures will not be able to check the general government because of the supremacy clause and the Congress won't be able to check itself because "I have, in some former numbers, shewn, that the representation in the proposed government will be a mere shadow without the substance."
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| Jan 29, 1788: Agrippa XV (Massachusetts)
| Massachusetts Antifederalist Agrippa, with James Wilson's October speech in mind, suggests " the friends of the new plan appear to have nothing more in view than to establish it by a popular current, without any regard to the truth of its principles. Propositions, novel, erroneous and dangerous, are boldly advanced to support a system, which does not appear to be founded in, but in every instance to contradict, the experience of mankind."
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| Jan 31, 1788: Brutus XI (New York)
| Brutus claims "I have not met with any writer, who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy." To that end, he first examines the nature and extent of the judicial powers and second, "inquire(s) whether the courts who are to exercise them are so constituted as to afford reasonable ground of confidence that they will exercise them for the general good." He is particularly concerned with what we today would call judicial review. Article III, Section 2 says: "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, etc." His concern is: "what latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say." What particularly concerns Brutus is the word "equity." "By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it without being confined to the words or letter." And, note, he continues, "from this court there is no appeal." Accordingly, there will be a strong propensity within the Constitution to lead to the establishment of a consolidated rather than a confederated government by way of the power of judicial review. In fact, the judicial power enables the judiciary "to mold the government, into almost any shape they please."
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| February 1788
| Feb 5, 1788: Agrippa XVI (Massachusetts)
| Massachusetts Antifederalist Agrippa continues to address the delegates in attendance at "the Massachusetts Convention" Here he proposes that the delegates adopt fourteen amendments to the proposed Constitution. "If the new constitution means no more than the friends of it acknowledge, they certainly can have no objection to affixing a declaration in favor of the rights of states and of citizens, especially as a majority of the states have not yet voted upon it."
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| Feb 14, 1788: Brutus XII (New York)
| "In my last, I shewed, that the judicial power of the United States under the first clause of the second section of article eight, would be authorized to explain the constitution, not only according to its letter, but according to its spirit and intention, and having the power, they would strongly incline to give it such a construction so as to extend the powers of the general government, as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally the destruction, of that of the respective states." Here he shows how the judicial power "will operate in its exercise to effect these purposes." At the heart of judicial dominance is its power "to determine all questions that may arise in the course of legal discussion on the meaning and construction of the constitution." And then it will follow that these rulings will "guide the legislature in their construction of their powers." What if they use the Preamble in conjunction with Article I, Section 8 as their guide to the spirit of the Constitution? There are no limiting principles to be found there. The justices will "mold the government into almost any shape they please."
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| Feb 21, 1788: Sidney No. 2 (New York)
| The Antifederalist Sidney covered the "dangers of adopting the new Constitution." In this second essay, "I shall now proceed to consider & whether Americans have any good reason to put more confidence in their rulers than Europeans." His answer is a resounding "no." He recommends instead "the sentiments of Sidney: 'While I live I shall endeavor to preserve my liberty, or at least not consent to the destroying of it. I hope I shall die in the same principle in which I lived, and will no longer live than they can preserve me.'"
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| March 1788
| Mar 7, 1788: Maryland Farmer Essay III (Part 1) (Maryland)
| The Antifederalist Maryland Farmer states a common Antifederalist refrain, namely they are the true federalists. "The term federalists is therefore improperly applied to themselves, by the friends and supporters of the proposed constitution. This abuse of language does not help the cause; every degree of imposition serves only to irritate, but can never convince. They are national men, and their opponents, or at least a great majority of them, are federal, in the only true and strict sense of the word." And a national government is neither practicable nor desirable.
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| Mar 18, 1788: Maryland Farmer Essay III (Part 2) (Maryland)
| The Antifederalist Maryland Farmer, wary of the emergence of a high-toned social class, urges ordinary Americans to "preserve your jealousy & [for] on the preservation of parties, public liberty depends. Whenever men are unanimous on great public questions, whenever there is but one party, freedom ceases and despotism commences. The object of a free and wise people should be so to balance parties, that from the weakness of all you may be governed by the moderation of the combined judgments of the whole, not tyrannized ever by the blind passions of a few individuals."
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| Mar 20, 1788: Brutus XV (New York)
| Brutus reminds his reader that this is a continuation of Brutus XIV, where he showed "that the supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to no control. The business of this paper will be to illustrate this, and to show the danger that will result from it." His main point is "I question whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible." He is particularly concerned that the judges "feel themselves independent of heaven itself." 1) "There is no power above them that can correct their errors or control their decisions," 2) "they cannot be removed from office or suffer a diminution of their salaries, for any error in judgment or want of capacity," 3) "the power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature." Proof: "the supreme court … have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to correct their construction or do it away."
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