 1787
| October 1787
|  Oct 10, 1787: James Wilson Speech, Pennsylvania Packet (Pennsylvania)
| Federalist James Wilson _ s "State House Speech" was the first official, and most often cited, defence of the Constitution. Wilson directly confronted the objections of fellow Constitutional Convention delegates, Elbridge Gerry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph who refused to sign the Constitution. He argued that a Bill of Rights, while necessary and salutary at the state level, was "superfluous and absurd" at the federal level of government. Antifederalists treated this speech as representative of the Federalist position.
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| Oct 27, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 1 (New York)
| Hamilton says Americans have the opportunity and obligation to "decide the important question" can "good government" be established by "reflection and choice," or is mankind "forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force." To assist "our deliberations," he provides an outline of topics to be covered "in a series of papers." 1) "The utility of the union," 2) the "insufficiency" of the Articles of Confederation, 3) the minimum "energetic" government requirement, 4) "the true principles of republican government," 5) the analogy of the proposed Constitution to the State governments, 6) and the added security "to republican government, to liberty, and to property" provided by the proposed Constitution. He concludes this essay on the "momentous decision": adopt the Constitution or dismember the Union.
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| Oct 31, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 2 (New York)
| Jay urges, in the first of four essays, "calm and mature inquiries and reflections" as well as "cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation." He supports "sedate and candid consideration" of the Constitution, the product of the "mature deliberation" that took place in the summer of 1787. He favors the common ties of the Union and rejects the "novel idea" of seeking "safety and happiness" in three or four separate Confederacies.
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| November 1787
| Nov 14, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 6 (New York)
| Hamilton argues that ambition, rage, jealousy, envy, and vicinity are the five causes of war and faction. Such is human nature: "momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice." Reject the "visionary" notions of "perpetual peace," and that separate "commercial republics" are "pacific and well mannered."
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| November 1787
| Nov 20, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 8 (New York)
| Hamilton details the consequences of being disunited, including the presence of vast standing armies at the borders of each State. A united America, like the United Kingdom, will bring us the "safety from external danger & [which] & is the most powerful director of national conduct," rather than the disunited and hostile states of Europe.
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| Nov 21, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 9 (New York)
| Hamilton's five improvements in "the science of politics" were "either not known at all, or imperfectly understood by the ancients." They form the "broad and solid" foundation for the claim that America will succeed where previous regimes have failed. The improvements are 1) legislative checks and balances, 2) the separation of powers, 3) an independent judiciary, 4) a scheme of representation, 5) "the enlargement of the orbit." He suggests that concerning 5) it is not clear that Montesquieu has a definitive and relevant teaching on enlarging the orbit through federal arrangements. His distinctions seem "more subtle than accurate." And he chooses the Lycian Confederacy as his favorite where there is no equality of suffrage among the members and no sharp line protecting "internal administration." Anyway, our States are larger than the small republics he had in mind. Thus, we need to move beyond the "oracle" Montesquieu's understanding of federalism as a way of a) retaining the independence of small states deemed traditionally necessary for liberty and happiness yet b) joining such pre-existing entities together so that they can pool their resources for such limited goals as common defense. We need a new and American understanding of "the enlargement of the orbit."
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| Nov 22, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 10 (New York)
| This is the first essay by Madison in The Federalist. It contains twenty-three paragraphs. - The "violence of faction" is the "mortal disease" of popular governments. The public assemblies have been infected with the vice of majority tyranny: "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."
- What is a faction? "A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."
- How can we cure "the mischiefs of faction?" We can either cure it by I) "removing its causes," or II) "controlling its effects."
- There are "two methods of removing the causes of faction": I a) destroy "the liberty essential to its existence," or I b) give "to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."
- I a) is a "remedy that is worse than the disease," because it is "unwise." It entails the abolition of liberty, "which is essential to political life."
- I b) is "impracticable." Opinions, passions, and interests are unlikely to be in harmony. "The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government." And that leads to "the division of society into different interests and parties."
- Further consideration of I b). "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man." Thus, there are many sources of factions, "but the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property." The "regulation of these various and interfering interests," that "grow up of necessity in civilized nations & forms the principal task of modern legislation and forms the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government."
- Further consideration of I b). Legislators, alas, tend to be "advocates and parties to the causes which they determine." But "justice and the public good," require "impartiality."
- Further consideration of I b). "It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."
- Conclusion to I b) and the introduction to II. "The inference to which we are brought is that [I] the causes of faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of [II] controlling its effects."
- Further consideration of II) "controlling its effects." "The republican principle" of majority rule is the solution to minority faction. But what if we have majority faction? "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government, is then the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has labored and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind."
- The introduction of II a) and II b) as the solutions to majority faction. "Either [II a)] the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or [II b)] the majority having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression."
- The introduction of III, the form of government, to implement the solution. Madison declares that III a) "pure democracy," works against solutions II a) and II b.
- III b) "a republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking."
- "The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic."
- The first difference III b)* is "to refine and enlarge the public views" by way of the election system. The question is do we choose "small (IVa) or extensive (IVb) republics?"
- IV b) is better than IV a) because it provides "a greater probability of a fit choice" of representatives.
- IV b) is better than IV a) because it "will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried."
- The Constitution "forms a happy combination" of IVa) and IVb): "the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures."
- The second difference III b)** "is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government."
- III b)** clinches the case for IV b) over IV a).
- "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States."
- "In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."
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| Nov 24, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 11 (New York)
| "A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests can only result from a unity of government." There is another advantage to union: "it belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race," in Africa, Asia, and America. With a strong union, we can restrain "the arrogant pretensions of the Europeans," and "dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world." They think, "dogs cease to bark in America."
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| December 1787
| Dec 1, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 15 (New York)
| There is a "great and radical vice in the construction of the existing confederacy," says Hamilton. The structural "defect" of the confederacy is that it is a union of, by, for, and over states and not a government based on individuals. "The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing confederation is the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES OR GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist." He then asks the central question undergirding all the essays: "why has government been instituted at all?" The answer is: "because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint." Applied to the Articles, this answer suggests that "the ill-informed and prejudicial interference of particular administrators" in national issues ought to be of far greater concern than the other way around.
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| Dec 4, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 16 (New York)
| The traditional federal principle—legislation over states in their collective political capacity _ is anarchistic because it does not "address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals." The laws of a Confederacy can only be enforced by a large standing army. Thus we must adopt the principle of government over individuals for the people ought to be "the natural guardians of the Constitution." Hamilton introduces a brief introduction of judicial review and state nullification.
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| Dec 5, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 17 (New York)
| Hamilton raises a question: won't the federal government be so powerful that it will encroach on the States? No, The real problem is centrifugal and not centripetal. The States have "a greater degree of influence" in every day matters such as the "ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice" and they are physically closer to the people. "Affections are weak in proportion to distance or diffusiveness of the object." The objects of the federal government are limited to commerce, finance, negotiation, and war. In the end, however, the people will throw their loyalty to the level of government that "administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence."
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| Dec 18, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 23 (New York)
| Hamilton announces the start of several essays dealing with three topics: "the objects to be provided for by a federal government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, (and) the persons upon whom that power ought to operate." He states that the objects of the federal government encompass, 1) common defense, 2) domestic tranquillity, 3) the regulation of commerce, and 4) relations with foreign nations. And he reminds his readers that it is impossible to foresee future "national exigencies." Thus we need a degree of power—or energy _ commensurate to the end in view. He begins with 1) the war powers of the nation and declares them to be necessary and proper means to accomplishing the object of common defense. He finds the Antifederalist position to be an "absurdity": they support enlarged purposes but want limited powers! If it is safe to delegate the "object," isn't it safe to delegate the "power?"
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| Dec 19, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 24 (New York)
| The object of 1) common defense receives further coverage. Hamilton critiques, with the help of the observations a fictitious "stranger to our politics," the objection to the presence of standing armies in time of peace. We live in a hostile world, says Hamilton. Anyway, the power over military establishments is lodged in Congress. The two-year appropriation process, he asserts, is the appropriate protection against the abuse of military power and the creation of "unnecessary military establishments." He takes the opportunity to note that the Antifederalists have "misled" the electorate by exaggerating the presence of "bills of rights" that are "annexed" to State constitutions.
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| Dec 21, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 25 (New York)
| Further coverage of 1) common defense. Why wait until a formal declaration of war, asks Hamilton, prior to initiating the raising of an army? Anyway, "the formal ceremony of declaring war has fallen into disuse." That "we must receive the blow before we could even prepare to return it," is a "most extraordinary spectacle." We ought to be "cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed" because "necessity" will prevail over a "parchment barrier." If a breach, justified by necessity, becomes the norm, it will impair "the sacred reverence" for the "fundamental laws"
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| Dec 22, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 26 (New York)
| Further coverage of 1) common defense. An additional defense of the two-year appropriation process as a check on the abuse of a standing army. Don't tie down the legislature with parchment barriers on the means for providing for the common defense. To accept the end, but restrain the means, is to display "a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened."
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| Dec 25, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 27 (New York)
| Coverage turns to 2) domestic tranquillity by way of 1) common defense. Hamilton responds to the claim that the Constitution "cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws." He lays down "a general rule…of confidence in and obedience to a government." The people will support government in "proportion to the goodness or badness of its administration." He expects the American people will become more and more attached to the general government as it intermingles more in their daily lives.
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| Dec 26, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 28 (New York)
| Further coverage of 2) domestic tranquillity. Hamilton repeats his maxim "that the means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." Of course, the rule of law is generally the "admissible principle of republican government." But there will be emergencies involving domestic insurrection and the general government may have to use force. This conforms to "that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government." To think otherwise, is to engage in "the reveries" of naпve "political doctors." But what if the general government or State governments abuse their power? There are two lines of defense: 1) "the great extent of the country," and 2) "the people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate."
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| Dec 28, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 30 (New York)
| Hamilton turns to 3) the regulation of commerce. Once again he states the maxim that "every power ought to be proportionate to its object." This time, he applies it to taxation: "money is, with propriety, considered the vital principle of the body politic." He rejects the opposition proposal that the power of internal taxation be given to the States and the power of external taxation be given to the nation. This is romantic poetry.
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1788
| January 1788
| Jan 1, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 31 (New York)
| Further coverage of 3) the regulation of commerce. He repeats his point that the general government should not be excluded ahead of time from exercising certain means of raising revenue since the world is full of contingency. Moreover, there are certain "maxims in politics"—"first principles," or "primary truths" _ governing the relationship between ends or objects on the one hand and means or powers on the other hand: the government must be given the "requisite" means for the "complete execution" of the objects "for which it is responsible." But, say the opposition, the States don't have a guaranteed source of revenue and won't be able to protect themselves from the usurpations by general government. More "enchanted castle," nonsense replies Hamilton. We should leave the preservation of the "constitutional equilibrium" between the two levels of government "to the prudence and firmness of the people."
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| Jan 2, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 32 (New York)
| Further coverage of 3) the regulation of commerce. Hamilton reminds the reader that the Constitution is a "partial consolidation" rather than "an entire consolidation." Accordingly, he employs the three-pronged "negative pregnant" test to grasp "the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed constitution." He applies the test to the power of taxation: a) is the power exclusively granted to the union? "No." b) is the power prohibited to the States? "No." And c) is the power granted to the union and it makes no sense that the states have concurrent jurisdiction? "No." He concludes, therefore, that it was the "sense of the convention," to permit the states to retain the power of concurrent taxation.
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| Jan 2,1788: Federalist Paper No. 33 (New York)
| Further coverage of 3) the regulation of commerce. Hamilton answers the following Antifederalist claim grounded in "virulent invective and petulant declamation," namely, that the necessary and proper clause and the supremacy clause will enable the general government to completely take over the power of taxation and thus destroy local government and individual liberty. Not so; nothing would change if these clauses weren't even there. Isn't the power of taxation given to the general government? All clause 18—the so-called "sweeping clause _ is saying is that Congress can "pass all laws necessary and proper to carry it into effect." Why, then, was "the clause introduced?" The Convention saw this "tautology" as a precautionary protection of the general government against later attempts "to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union." Anyway, in the end, it is the people of America who will decide the meaning of necessary and proper. And without the supremacy clause, the arrangement would be a mere treaty.
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| Jan 5, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 34 (New York)
| Further coverage of 3) the regulation of commerce. Hamilton repeats his claim that when thinking about the expenses of government we ought not to tie the hands of the general government. "If we mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce." Accordingly, we must be aware of "future contingencies," in designing a Constitution that is to last into "remote futurity." In framing a Constitution, as distinguished from writing legislation, we ought to focus on the future and the permanent rather than the current and temporary scene.
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| Jan 5, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 35 (New York)
| Further coverage of 3) the regulation of commerce. This essay explores the relationship between the power of taxation and the right of representation. Hamilton criticizes the "frequent objection" of the Antifederalists that the House "is not sufficiently numerous" to provide for a complete and sympathetic representation of the people. He portrays this argument as "impracticable" and "unnecessary." First, "an actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each class is altogether visionary." Second, the Congress need not be an exact mirror of the society. Third, a dependency on the people, and being bound by the very laws he makes, are "the strong chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent." Finally, we need representatives capable of exercising "neutrality" and "impartiality" in the clash between the agricultural and mercantile interests. That is the role of the "learned professions."
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| Jan 8, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 36 (New York)
| Further coverage of 3) "of the regulation of commerce." Additional emphasis is given to representation and taxation. If we leave things alone, then merchants, landowners, and the learned professions will be elected to Congress. They "will truly represent all those different interests and views" across the extended republic. He concludes his coverage of the "energy" essays thus: "Happy will it be for ourselves, and most honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set so glorious an example to mankind!"
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| January 1788
| Jan 9, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 29 (New York)
| Further coverage of 2) domestic tranquillity. Hamilton argues for the existence of a well-regulated militia under the control of the general government. He accuses the Antifederalists of "a striking incoherence:" they want neither a militia nor an army! Is this "the inflammatory ravings if chagrined incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts?"
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| Jan 11, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 37 (New York)
| This is the first of fifteen essays written by Madison that provide a window on the "work of the convention." He says, "a faultless plan was not to be expected." The "indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception, [and] inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas" each made the founding of the Constitution "a great difficulty." 1) Humans are fallible, 2) the undertaking was "novel," 3) "minglingftogether" and "defining with certainty," the "vital principles" of liberty, energy, and stability in the legislature, executive, and judiciary was very difficult, 4) drawing the line between the powers of the general government and the state governments was "no less arduous," 5) the "imperfection of the human faculties" is clear and so "meaning" must be "liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications," and 6) "contending interests and local jealousies" had to be dealt with. It is astonishing that "so many difficulties should have been surmounted." Is this the result of the "finger" of "the Almighty hand" at work?
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| Jan 12, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 38 (New York)
| The creation of the Constitution faced another difficulty. It is an "experiment." This is the first in the history of the world to have "been committed to an assembly of men." But, instead of acknowledging "the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government," the Antifederalists criticize the plan in an incoherent and irrelevant manner and demand perfection. Yet "are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be substituted?"
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| Jan 16, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 39 (New York)
| Madison addresses two questions: does the Constitution pass 1) the republicanism test and 2) the federalism test? The answer depends on how we define republicanism and federalism. These are the "great difficulties" of definition. 1) The "genius of the people of America," and "the fundamental principles of the Revolution," demand that we "rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self government." If the Constitution departs from the "strictly republican" standard, or "character," it must be rejected. What, then, is the definition of a republic? It is "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding office during good behavior." We learn that a) "it is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it," and b) it is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified." Madison announces that the Constitution passes the test. 2) There are three tests to measure the federalism of the Constitution, the first of which—a) "the real character of the government"—is covered in the remainder of the essay. There are five "considerations" to ponder when dealing with the "real character" standard. I) "The foundation on which it is to be established." Who ratifies the Constitution, the states or the people? II) "The sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn." Are the people or the states represented in the Congress? III) "The operation of those powers." Does the government "operate" directly on the people in their "individual capacities" or on the states in "their collective and political capacities?" IV) "The extent of`… the powers." Does the general government have "an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," or does its jurisdiction extend "to certain enumerated objects only?" V) "The authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced." Are amendments secured by a majority of the people or by the unanimity of the States? Madison concludes that it is "in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national."
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| Jan 18, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 40 (New York)
| Madison turns to the second and third tests, or difficulties, concerning the "federalism" of the Constitution. b) Was the convention "authorized to propose such a government?" Madison's response is that the delegates were authorized to frame a government "adequate to the exigencies of the Union," and they performed that task, and c) how far did "considerations of duty arising out of the case itself…supply any defect of regular authority?" Madison acknowledges that there are some doubts that Congress authorized the delegates to devise a plan that totally overhauled, rather than simply amended, the Articles. So he appeals to the Declaration of Independence: "it is the precious right of the people to 'abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.'" So the really important question is NOT is the plan legal in the narrow sense of the term, but "whether the advice (of the Convention) be good?"
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| Jan 19, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 41 (New York)
| This is the first of six essays on the difficulty of powers and federalism. This difficulty, in turn, can be divided into two parts around the consideration of two questions. The first difficulty of powers and federalism is this: has any unnecessary and improper power been granted to the general government? This is covered in Federalist 41-44. The answer is "no." (The second difficulty is this: is the mass of power granted to the federal government dangerous to the exercise of power retained by the states? This is covered in Federalist 45-46.) Six "classes" [1-6 below] of the first difficulty of power and federalism in the Constitution are examined. Federalist 41 examines the 1) "security against foreign danger" class of power. Madison reiterates Hamilton's earlier defense of the Constitution with respect to military establishments, standing armies, the militia, the power of taxation, and the war powers of the general government.
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| Jan 22, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 42 (New York)
| This essay examines the second and third classes of federal power: 2) "regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations," and 3) "maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the states." The former covers the implications of the "interstate commerce" clause. The latter focuses on the remaining clauses in Article I, Section 8. Madison regrets that 2) the "power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation." Nevertheless, he is optimistic that the "the barbarism of modern policy" will be soon "totally abolished." He concludes: "Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren." Concerning 3) Madison laments that "the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain."
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| Jan 23, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 43 (New York)
| This essay examines the fourth class of federal power: 4) "certain miscellaneous objects of general utility." Nine miscellaneous clauses are covered. Most attention is given to the sixth clause, namely, the republican guarantee clause. The main issues here are a) "to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations," and b) to protect the principle of majority rule against the actions of a minority of "adventurers." Madison then adds: "I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves." The ninth and last clause covered is Article VII. This clause provides for ratification of the Constitution by nine out of thirteen specially called conventions. Madison asks: how can the Articles be "superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? The answer, anticipated in Federalist 40, is "the great principle of self-preservation: to the transcendent law of nature and nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of the society are the objects at which all political institutions aim and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed."
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| Jan 25, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 44 (New York)
| This essay examines the fifth and six classes of federal power: 5) "restraint of the States from certain injurious acts," and 6) "provisions for giving due efficacy to these powers." The latter revisits the necessary and proper clause. "Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, as has been elsewhere shown, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the substance of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter." He examines, and rejects, the four choices, other than the one stated in Article 1, Section 8, clause 18, that were available to the convention: a) adopt the "expressly" delegated language of the Articles, b) list a "positive enumeration of the powers" attached to the necessary and proper clause, c) list a "negative enumeration" of the powers not attached, and d) remain "altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference." All the clause is saying is that "wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." And if Congress should abuse this power? "The people…can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers."
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| Jan 26, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 45 (New York)
| This essay starts the consideration of the second difficulty of power and federalism: is the mass of power granted to the federal government dangerous to the exercise of power retained by the states? The answer is "no." Federalist 45 begins with the question: was the revolution fought to secure the peace, liberty, safety, and public good of the American people or to secure the sovereignty of the states? Madison says, the former, and he is willing, if necessary, to sacrifice the states for the "public happiness." But it will be difficult to do away with the states even if one wanted to because they are " constituent and essential parts of the federal government." Besides, "the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." Actually, he concludes, the Constitution doesn't enlarge the powers of the federal government; "it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them." But the federal government will grow in importance during wartime.
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| Jan 29, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 46 (New York)
| This essay concludes the consideration of the second difficulty of power and federalism: is the mass of power granted to the federal government dangerous to the exercise of power retained by the states? The answer, again, is "no." Madison suggests that the federal government has more to fear from the encroachment of the state governments than vice versa. And the state governments are capable of defending themselves. The sentiments of the people are naturally closer to the state governments and things will stay that way unless the federal government is better administered. In which case, "the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be the most due."
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| Jan 30, 1788: Federalist Paper No. 47 (New York)
| This is the first of five essays on the difficulty of republicanism. He is interested in "the structure" of the government. Madison begins with a "political truth": "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands…may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Antifederalists, relying on Montesquieu the "oracle" on the doctrine of separation of powers, claim that the Constitution violates the political truth or maxim, because the branches are not separate and "distinct." Madison argues 1) that Montesquieu wasn't advocating a complete "wall of separation" between the branches, but endorsed "partial agency," b) there isn't a strictly "distinct" separation of powers in the state constitutions and 3) the "political truth" really means that the separation of powers is violated when "the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department," and not when one branch has a partial agency in another branch. In fact, partial agency in practice is needed to accomplish the separation of powers in theory. |
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