 1787
| October 1787
|  Oct 5, 1787: Centinel I (Pennsylvania)
| The Antifederalist Centinel suggests that "all the blessings of liberty and the dearest privileges of freemen are now at stake and dependent on your present conduct." But since the plan is inspired by John Adams's political thought which presumes 1) a balancing of the orders of society and 2) that "the administrators of every government are actuated by views of private interest and ambition & [and] & jarring adverse interests." Furthermore, the plan encourages the exercise of extensive powers over an extensive territory which is a recipe not "for a regular balanced government & but & a permanent ARISTOCRACY."
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| Oct 8, 1787: Federal Farmer No. 1 (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer says the proposed Constitution "appears to be a plan retaining some federal features, but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly, to one consolidated government of the United States." We ought not to hastily adopt this plan supported by "ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men." He shares a deep regret: "The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States."
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| Oct 9, 1787: Federal Farmer No. 2 (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer focuses on three main objections in this essay. He claims that the proposed Constitution 1) fails the "full and equal representation" test 2) inadequately separates the powers of government and 3) has a strong tendency to consolidation.
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| Oct 10, 1787: Federal Farmer No. 3 (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer continues his critique of the proposed Constitution: "I will examine first, the organization of the proposed government in order to judge, second, with propriety, what powers are improperly, at least prematurely lodged in it. I shall examine, third, the undefined powers, and fourth, those powers, the exercise of which is not secured on safe and proper ground."
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| Oct 10, 1787: James Wilson Speech, Pennsylvania Packet (Pennsylvania)
| Federalist James Wilson _ s "State House Speech" was the first official, and most often cited, defence of the Constitution. Wilson directly confronted the objections of fellow Constitutional Convention delegates, Elbridge Gerry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph who refused to sign the Constitution. He argued that a Bill of Rights, while necessary and salutary at the state level, was "superfluous and absurd" at the federal level of government. Antifederalists treated this speech as representative of the Federalist position.
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| Oct 12, 1787: Federal Farmer No. 4 (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer, without mentioning James Wilson by name, criticizes the premise of the State House speech that a Bill of Rights is unnecessary and dangerous. But, he argues, aren't Article One Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution a partial Bill of Rights so why don't we drop them or go the whole distance on behalf of a Bill of Rights?
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| Oct 16, 1787: Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (New York)
| Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee, introducer of the Declaration of Independence, presumed author of the influential Federal Farmer essays and president of the Confederation Congress, suggested fourteen necessary and proper amendments to the proposed constitution, all designed "to protect the just rights and liberty of mankind from the silent powerful and ever active conspiracy of those who govern."
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| Oct 18, 1787: Brutus No. 1 (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist Brutus, anticipating both Federalist 1 and 10, argues that 1) "the most important question that was ever proposed to your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you," 2) "in so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon become above the control of the people, and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves and oppressing them." He recommends rejection of the proposed plan.
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| Oct 18, 1787: Elbridge Gerry's Objections (Massachusetts)
| The Antifederalist Elbridge Gerry submits to the Massachusetts Legislature his principal reasons for not signing the Constitution on 17 September 1787 "that there is no adequate provision for a representation of the people; that they have no security for the right of election; that some of the powers of the Legislature are ambiguous, and others indefinite and dangerous, that the Executive is blended with and will have an undue influence over the Legislature; that the judicial department will be oppressive; that treaties of the highest importance may be formed by the President with the advice of two thirds of a quorum of the Senate; and that the system is without the security of a bill of rights." He urges that the plan be amended before being adopted.
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| Oct 25, 1787: Cato No. 3 (New York)
| New York Antifederalist Cato takes up "this new form of national government," and compares it with "the experience and opinions of the most sensible and approved political authors, and to show you that its principles, and the exercise of them, will be dangerous to your liberty and happiness." In particular, he shows that the proposed Constitution deviates from the teaching of the great oracle Montesquieu on federalism.
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| Oct 27, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 1 (New York)
| Hamilton says Americans have the opportunity and obligation to "decide the important question" can "good government" be established by "reflection and choice," or is mankind "forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force." To assist "our deliberations," he provides an outline of topics to be covered "in a series of papers." 1) "The utility of the union," 2) the "insufficiency" of the Articles of Confederation, 3) the minimum "energetic" government requirement, 4) "the true principles of republican government," 5) the analogy of the proposed Constitution to the State governments, 6) and the added security "to republican government, to liberty, and to property" provided by the proposed Constitution. He concludes this essay on the "momentous decision": adopt the Constitution or dismember the Union.
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| Oct 31, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 2 (New York)
| Jay urges, in the first of four essays, "calm and mature inquiries and reflections" as well as "cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation." He supports "sedate and candid consideration" of the Constitution, the product of the "mature deliberation" that took place in the summer of 1787. He favors the common ties of the Union and rejects the "novel idea" of seeking "safety and happiness" in three or four separate Confederacies.
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| November 1787
| Nov 1, 1787: Brutus No. 2 (New York)
| Antifederalist Brutus argued that the proposed plan of government failed to provide adequate protection to individual rights of conscience, the liberty of the press, the freedom of association and the right of the people to the expectation of no unreasonable searches and no cruel and unreasonable punishments. Without mentioning James Wilson by name, he criticizes the contract theory in the State House Speech that declares a bill of Rights to be superfluous & And in direct contrast to the teachings of Federalist 10 and 51, Brutus suggests that the great art "in forming a good constitution appears to be this: so to frame it as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible way to effect this but by an equal, full, and fair representation."
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| Nov 8, 1787: Centinel III (Pennsylvania)
| The Antifederalist Centinel, echoing the remarks of Federalist 1, reminds his readers that they are called upon to make a decision "which involves in it not only your fate, but that of your posterity for ages to come." Your determination will either ensure the possession of those blessings which render life desirable, or entail those evils which make existence a curse. That such are the consequences of a wise or improper organization of government, the history of mankind abundantly testifies." Unfortunately, however, the proponents "have hurried on its adoption with a precipitation that betrays their design." They are up to no good.
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| Nov 14, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 6 (New York)
| Hamilton argues that ambition, rage, jealousy, envy, and vicinity are the five causes of war and faction. Such is human nature: "momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice." Reject the "visionary" notions of "perpetual peace," and that separate "commercial republics" are "pacific and well mannered."
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| Nov 15, 1787: Brutus No. 3 (New York)
| The Antifederalist Brutus continues his efforts to point out "the principal defects" of the proposed Constitution. He examines "its parts more minutely, and show[s] that the powers are not properly deposited for the security of public liberty." He criticizes the scheme of representation in both the House and Senate. The small number of representatives to be chosen violates the core meaning of representation: "those who are placed instead of the people should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be governed by their interests; or, in other words, should bear the strongest resemblance of those in whose room they are substituted." But under the plan "the well born and highest orders in life, " and not "the farmer, merchant, mechanic" will be represented
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| Nov 15, 1787: Essay by a Georgian (Georgia)
| The Antifederalist A Georgian invites his readers to decide whether or not the new plan of government conforms to "that very government intended by our glorious Declaration of Independence." He is concerned that the proposed government will lead to the erection of "an ARISTOCRATIC government, whereby about 70 nabobs would lord over three millions of people as slaves." He begs his readers to "call to mind our glorious Declaration of Independence; read it, and compare it with the federal constitution; what a degree of apostacy will you not then discover." Guard "against the numberless evils of an unlimited taxation, against the fatal effects of a standing army in times of peace, against an unfair and too small representation."
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| November 1787
| Nov 20, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 8 (New York)
| Hamilton details the consequences of being disunited, including the presence of vast standing armies at the borders of each State. A united America, like the United Kingdom, will bring us the "safety from external danger & [which] & is the most powerful director of national conduct," rather than the disunited and hostile states of Europe.
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| Nov 21, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 9 (New York)
| Hamilton's five improvements in "the science of politics" were "either not known at all, or imperfectly understood by the ancients." They form the "broad and solid" foundation for the claim that America will succeed where previous regimes have failed. The improvements are 1) legislative checks and balances, 2) the separation of powers, 3) an independent judiciary, 4) a scheme of representation, 5) "the enlargement of the orbit." He suggests that concerning 5) it is not clear that Montesquieu has a definitive and relevant teaching on enlarging the orbit through federal arrangements. His distinctions seem "more subtle than accurate." And he chooses the Lycian Confederacy as his favorite where there is no equality of suffrage among the members and no sharp line protecting "internal administration." Anyway, our States are larger than the small republics he had in mind. Thus, we need to move beyond the "oracle" Montesquieu's understanding of federalism as a way of a) retaining the independence of small states deemed traditionally necessary for liberty and happiness yet b) joining such pre-existing entities together so that they can pool their resources for such limited goals as common defense. We need a new and American understanding of "the enlargement of the orbit."
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| Nov 22, 1787: Cato No. 5 (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist Cato criticizes the scheme of representation articulated in Article One of the proposed Constitution: "biennial elections for representatives are a departure from the safe democratic principle of annual ones, that the number of representatives are too few," and that the Senate contains the seeds of aristocracy.
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| Nov 22, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 10 (New York)
| This is the first essay by Madison in The Federalist. It contains twenty-three paragraphs. - The "violence of faction" is the "mortal disease" of popular governments. The public assemblies have been infected with the vice of majority tyranny: "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."
- What is a faction? "A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."
- How can we cure "the mischiefs of faction?" We can either cure it by I) "removing its causes," or II) "controlling its effects."
- There are "two methods of removing the causes of faction": I a) destroy "the liberty essential to its existence," or I b) give "to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."
- I a) is a "remedy that is worse than the disease," because it is "unwise." It entails the abolition of liberty, "which is essential to political life."
- I b) is "impracticable." Opinions, passions, and interests are unlikely to be in harmony. "The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government." And that leads to "the division of society into different interests and parties."
- Further consideration of I b). "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man." Thus, there are many sources of factions, "but the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property." The "regulation of these various and interfering interests," that "grow up of necessity in civilized nations & forms the principal task of modern legislation and forms the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government."
- Further consideration of I b). Legislators, alas, tend to be "advocates and parties to the causes which they determine." But "justice and the public good," require "impartiality."
- Further consideration of I b). "It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."
- Conclusion to I b) and the introduction to II. "The inference to which we are brought is that [I] the causes of faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of [II] controlling its effects."
- Further consideration of II) "controlling its effects." "The republican principle" of majority rule is the solution to minority faction. But what if we have majority faction? "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government, is then the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has labored and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind."
- The introduction of II a) and II b) as the solutions to majority faction. "Either [II a)] the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or [II b)] the majority having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression."
- The introduction of III, the form of government, to implement the solution. Madison declares that III a) "pure democracy," works against solutions II a) and II b.
- III b) "a republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking."
- "The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic."
- The first difference III b)* is "to refine and enlarge the public views" by way of the election system. The question is do we choose "small (IVa) or extensive (IVb) republics?"
- IV b) is better than IV a) because it provides "a greater probability of a fit choice" of representatives.
- IV b) is better than IV a) because it "will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried."
- The Constitution "forms a happy combination" of IVa) and IVb): "the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures."
- The second difference III b)** "is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government."
- III b)** clinches the case for IV b) over IV a).
- "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States."
- "In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."
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| Nov 24, 1787: Federalist Paper No. 11 (New York)
| "A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests can only result from a unity of government." There is another advantage to union: "it belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race," in Africa, Asia, and America. With a strong union, we can restrain "the arrogant pretensions of the Europeans," and "dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world." They think, "dogs cease to bark in America."
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